Digital Network ID: negative interest rates
Showing posts with label negative interest rates. Show all posts
Showing posts with label negative interest rates. Show all posts

14 Jun 2020

Summers tweet stream on secular stagnation - Barokong

Larry Summers has an interesting tweet stream (HT Marginal Revolution) on the state of monetary policy. Much I agree with and find insightful:

Can central banking as we know it be the primary tool of macroeconomic stabilization in the industrial world over the next decade?...There is little room for interest rate cuts..QE and forward guidance have been tried on a substantial scale....It is hard to believe that changing adverbs here and there or altering the timing of press conferences or the mode of presenting projections is consequential...interest rates stuck at zero with no real prospect of escape - is now the confident market expectation in Europe & Japan, with essentially zero or negative yields over a generation....The one thing that was taught as axiomatic to economics students around the world was that monetary authorities could over the long term create as much inflation as they wanted through monetary policy. This proposition is now very much in doubt.
Agreed so far, and well put. "Monetary policy" here means buying government bonds and issuing reserves in return, or lowering short-term interest rates. I am still intrigued by the possibility that a commitment to permanently higher rates might raise inflation, but that's quite speculative.

and later

Limited nominal GDP growth in the face of very low interest rates has been interpreted as evidence simply that the neutral rate has fallen substantially....We believe it is at least equally plausible that the impact of interest rates on aggregate demand has declined sharply, and that the marginal impact falls off as rates fall.  It is even plausible that in some cases interest rate cuts may reduce aggregate demand: because of target saving behavior, reversal rate effects on fin. intermediaries, option effects on irreversible investment, and the arithmetic effect of lower rates on gov’t deficits
Central banks are a lot less powerful than everyone seems to think, and potentially for deep reasons. File this as speculative but very interesting. Larry has many thoughts on why lowering interest rates may be ineffective or unwise.

The question is just how bad this is? The economy is growing, unemployment is at an all time low, inflation is nonexistent, the dollar is strong. Larry and I grew up in the 1970s, and monetary affairs can be a lot worse.

Yes, the worry is how much the Fed can "stimulate" in the next recession. But it is not obvious to me that recessions come from somewhere else and are much mitigated by lowering short term rates as "stimulus." Many postwar recessions were induced by the Fed, and the Great Depression was made much worse by the Fed. Perhaps it is enough for the Fed simply not to screw up -- do its supervisory job of enforcing capital standards in booms (please, at last!) do its lender of last resort job in financial crises, and don't make matters worse.

But how bad is it now? Here Larry and I part company. Larry is, surprisingly to me, still pushing "secular stagnation"

Call it the black hole problem, secular stagnation, or Japanification, this set of issues should be what central banks are worrying about...We have come to agree w/ the point long stressed by Post Keynesian economists & recently emphasized by Palley that the role of specific frictions in economic fluctuations should be de-emphasized relative to a more fundamental lack of aggregate demand.
The right issue for macroeconomists to be focused on is assuring adequate aggregate demand.
My jaw drops.

The unemployment rate is 3.9%, lower than it has ever been in a half century. It fell faster after about 2014 than in the last two recessions.

Labor force participation is trending back up.

Wages are rising faster and faster, especially for less skilled and education educated workers.

There are 8 million job openings in the US.

Why in the world are we talking about "lack of demand?

Larry had a point about secular stagnation in about 2014. The Great Recession was dragging on seemingly forever. There was a good debate about "secular stagnation" vs. sand in the gears -- the cumulative effects of Obamacare, Dodd Frank, and the regulatory war on capital. But those days are over. How can anyone be seriously talking about "lack of demand" now?

Yes, despite the clearly full employment labor market, GDP is growing more slowly than I think is possible, and I can infer Larry agrees. But at full employment slow GDP growth comes from too slow productivity growth.

Let me suggest the alternative:

The right issue for macroeconomists to be focused on is assuring adequate aggregate supply.
[This is me, not Larry]. We need now a "pro-growth" agenda. When you're out of recession and financial crisis, further growth comes from "supply." And there is plenty to work on there. Alas, supply requires a Marie Kondoing of our public life, not a grand new initiative. Fix all they little things: zoning, agricultural policy, tax reform, reducing disincentives of social programs, continued regulatory reform, cutting tariffs, occupational licensing, and on and on. Macroeconomists (and growth economists) should be focusing on microeconomics.

Larry goes utterly in the opposite direction:

Obviously fiscal policy needs to be a major focus, especially given what low or negative interest rates mean for the sustainability of deficits.
But the level of demand is also influenced by structural policies: e.g. pay-as-you-go social security, higher retirement ages, improved social insurance, support for private infrastructure investment, redistribution from the high-saving rich to the liquidity-constrained poor.
OMG. In case you can't read between the lines, the first paragraph means deliberate even larger deficits. "infrastructure investment" in the US today means more $4 billion per mile subways and high speed trains to nowhere. Redistribution to the liquidity constrained means forcibly taking away hard earned money to give it to people who have maxed out their credit cards.

(The latter is an especially pernicious argument. If the point is to give money to those who will consume it more effectively than us hopelessly frugal savers, then give it to the liquidity constrained rich too, and do not give it to the frugal poor.  This is a classic case of an answer in search of a question, as the question does not lead to income-based redistribution.)

Larry isn't quite at the Magical Monetary Theory and Green New Deal blowout here. But I only infer that from his previous statements critical of those for going too far. This is darn close and all in the same direction.

One might defend Larry that previously he was talking about contingency plans for stimulus in a recession. But these are permanent, structural policies that come and stay for a generation.

I thought of Larry as the epitome of centrist, sensible, technocratic Democratic Party stalwarts, alongside say Alan Blinder, who wrote quite sensibly in the WSJ warning against the excesses of Green New Deal and health care for all. I still have hope that that sensible wing of the party will prevail, and join with the sensible wing of Republicans (there still is one) to fix the supply end of our country. But this is an amazing sharp left turn.

Larry's closers with another intriguing thought.

The high inflation and high interest rates of the 1970s generated a revolution in macroeconomic thinking, policy and institutions. The low inflation, low interest rates and stagnation of the last decade has been longer and more serious and deserves at least an equal response
Well put and yes indeed. But in my view, Alvin Hansen's 1939 speculations about eternal lack of demand and a soft version of AOC-Sanders-Warren deficit financed spending blowout and "redistribution" aren't it. Marie-Kondoing the massive clutter and disincentives on the growth side of our economy is.

12 May 2020

Kocherlakota on moral hazard - Barokong

I found a kindred spirit. Narayana Kocherlakota, ex president of the Minneapolis Fed, shares my concerns over the current lending and bailout spree, in particular propping up the prices of corporate bonds.

In its last financial stability report of 2019, the Fed highlighted how many nonfinancial corporations were making use of highly risky debt. The report pointed out that “a number of contacts expressed concern that a U.S. recession would expose highly leveraged sectors … concerns related to nonfinancial corporate debt were cited most frequently, with a focus on the growth in leveraged loans, private credit, and triple-B-rated bonds.”

The financial stability report, of course, made no mention of pandemics or social distancing. It didn't need to — the risk to the financial system and the economy is posed by any recessionary shock. The coronavirus just happened to be the first one that come along.

Narayana hits on a good point here. I think there is a lot of sympathy for corporations, like airlines, because "this wasn't their fault." But a recession is never an individual company's fault. And the premium you get -- the higher interest rate -- for holding corporate debt comes entirely from the fact that corporate bonds lose value in recessions -- in aggregate "bad times." The Fed is willing to let us hold idiosyncratic risk. But idiosyncratic risk is not priced.

Or perhaps the market is allowed to absorb risk for little recessions but "this shock was too big." Well, it's also taking the left tail that generates the premium.

In the 2007-09 financial crisis, governments around the world engaged in large amounts of subsidized lending to financial institutions. These interventions were rightly seen by many as a subsidy to future risk-taking by those institutions — risk-taking that can deepen any recessionary shock. To prevent this moral hazard, financial institutions are now required hold a lot more capital — that is, be much less leveraged, thus lowering the need for future bailouts.
We shouldn't let the novel source of the 2020 downturn fool us: The interventions by the Fed and Treasury are creating the same sort of subsidy for risk-taking by nonfinancial corporations. We will need the same kind of post-recession policy response: Congress should use its power to tax or regulate to discourage or even bar the country's large corporations from being too highly leveraged or using risky financing instruments. Otherwise, corporation will be further incentivized to take on too much risk and force another, possibly larger, bailout when another recession hits.

6 May 2020

Strategies for Monetary Policy - Barokong

At that link, you can see the table of contents and read Chapter pdfs for free. You can buy the book for $14.95 or get a free ebook.

The conference program and videos are still up.

Much of the conference was about the question, what will the Fed do during the next downturn? Here we are, and I think it is a valuable snapshot. Of course I have some self interest in that view.

As long as I'm shamelessly promoting, I'll put in another plug for my related Homer Jones Lecture at the St. Louis Fed, video here and the articleStrategic Review and Beyond: Rethinking Monetary Policy and Independence here. That was written and delivered in early March, about 5 minutes before the lookouts said "Iceberg ahead." John and I don't put a lot of our own work into the conference books, but it sparked a lot of thoughts.  I am grateful to Jim Bullard and the St. Louis Fed for the chance to put those together.

Monetary policy is back to "forget about moral hazard, rules, strategies and the rest, the world is ending." This is a philosophy that happens quite regularly and now has become the rule and strategy. So strategic thinking about monetary policy is more important than ever.  This is a philosophy very much due to John Taylor.

The last part of my Homer Jones paper delves into just what risks the big thinkers of central banking were worried about on the eve of the pandemic. Pandemic was not in any stress test.  BIS, BoE, FSB and IMF  wanted everyone to start stress testing ... climate change and inequality. This is a story that needs more telling.

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Anies Baswedan

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