Digital Network ID: Interesting Papers
Showing posts with label Interesting Papers. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Interesting Papers. Show all posts

19 Aug 2020

Syverson on the productivity slowdown - Barokong

Chad Syverson has an interesting new paper on the sources of the productivity slowdown.

Background to wake you up: Long-term US growth is slowing down. This is a (the!) big important issue in economics (one previous post).  And productivity -- how much each person can produce per hour -- is the only source of long-term growth. We are not vastly better off than our grandparents because we negotiated better wages for hacking at coal with pickaxes.

Why is productivity slowing down? Perhaps we've run out of ideas (Gordon). Perhaps a savings glut and the  zero bound drive secular stagnation lack of demand (Summers). Perhaps the out of control regulatory leviathan is killing growth with a thousand cuts (Cochrane).

Or maybe productivity  isn't declining at all, we're just measuring new products badly (Varian; Silicon Valley). Google maps is free! If so, we are living with undiagnosed but healthy deflation, and real GDP growth is actually doing well.

Chad:

First, the productivity slowdown has occurred in dozens of countries, and its size is unrelated to measures of the countries’ consumption or production intensities of information and communication technologies ... Second, estimates... of the surplus created by internet-linked digital technologies fall far short of the $2.7 trillion or more of “missing output” resulting from the productivity growth slowdown...Third, if measurement problems were to account for even a modest share of this missing output, the properly measured output and productivity growth rates of industries that produce and service ICTs [internet] would have to have been multiples of their measured growth in the data. Fourth, while measured gross domestic income has been on average higher than measured gross domestic product since 2004—perhaps indicating workers are being paid to make products that are given away for free or at highly discounted prices—this trend actually began before the productivity slowdown and moreover reflects unusually high capital income rather than labor income (i.e., profits are unusually high). In combination, these complementary facets of evidence suggest that the reasonable prima facie case for the mismeasurement hypothesis faces real hurdles when confronted with the data.

An interesting read throughout.

[Except for that last sentence, a near parody of academic caution!]

17 Aug 2020

NYT on zoning - Barokong

Conor Dougherty in The New York Times has a good article on zoning laws,

a growing body of economic literature suggests that anti-growth sentiment... is a major factor in creating a stagnant and less equal American economy.
...Unlike past decades, when people of different socioeconomic backgrounds tended to move to similar areas, today, less-skilled workers often go where jobs are scarcer but housing is cheap, instead of heading to places with the most promising job opportunities  according to research by Daniel Shoag, a professor of public policy at Harvard, and Peter Ganong, also of Harvard.
One reason they’re not migrating to places with better job prospects is that rich cities like San Francisco and Seattle have gotten so expensive that working-class people cannot afford to move there. Even if they could, there would not be much point, since whatever they gained in pay would be swallowed up by rent.
Stop and rejoice. This is, after all, the New York Times, not the Cato Review. One might expect high housing prices to get blamed on developers, greed, or something, and the solution to be government-constructed housing, "affordable" housing mandates, rent controls, low-income housing subsidies (which protect incumbent low-income people, not those who want to move in to get better jobs) and even more restrictions.

No. The Times, the Obama Administration, California Governor Gerry Brown, have figured out that zoning laws are to blame, and they're making social stratification and inequality worse.

In response, a group of politicians, including Gov. Jerry Brown of California and President Obama, are joining with developers in trying to get cities to streamline many of the local zoning laws that, they say, make homes more expensive and hold too many newcomers at bay.
.. laws aimed at things like “maintaining neighborhood character” or limiting how many unrelated people can live together in the same house contribute to racial segregation and deeper class disparities. They also exacerbate inequality by restricting the housing supply in places where demand is greatest.
“You don’t want rules made entirely for people that have something, at the expense of people who don’t,” said Jason Furman, chairman of the White House Council of Economic Advisers.
This could be a lovely moment in which a bipartisan consensus can get together and fix a real problem.

The article focuses on Boulder Colorado, where

.. the university churns out smart people, the smart people attract employers, and the amenities make everyone want to stay. Twitter is expanding its offices downtown. A few miles away, a big hole full of construction equipment marks a new Google campus that will allow the company to expand its Boulder work force to 1,500 from 400.
Actually, The reason Google and Twitter are in Boulder is that things are much, much worse in Palo Alto! A fate Boulder may soon share:

“We don’t need one more job in Boulder,” Mr. Pomerance said. “We don’t need to grow anymore. Go somewhere else where they need you.”

8 Aug 2020

A Behavioral new-Keynesian Model - Barokong

Here are comments on Xavier Gabaix' "A Behavioral new-Keynesian model." Xavier presented at the October 21 NBER Economic Fluctuations and growth meeting, and I was the discussant. Slides here

Short summary: It's a really important paper. I think it's too important to be true.

Gabaix' irrationality fixes the pathologies of the standard model by making a stable model unstable, and hence locally determinate. Gabaix' irrationality parameter M in [0,1] can thus substitute for the usual Taylor principle that interest rates move more than one for one with inflation.

Gabaix imagines -- after three papers worth of careful math -- that people pay less attention to future income when deciding on consumption than they should.  Making today's consumption less sensitive to future income, means expectations of future income are larger for any amount of today's consumption. Thus, it makes model dynamics unstable.

But just a little irrationality won't do. If you move a stable eigenvalue, say 0.8, by a bit, say 0.85, it's still stable. You have to move it all the way past 1 before it does any good at all.

Thus, Gabaix puts irrationality right in the  middle of monetary policy. If Gabaix is right, you simply cannot explain monetary policy in simple terms with money supply and money demand, or interest rate rises lower investment and inflation via a Phillips curve, as simple approximations that more complex models, perhaps involving some irrationality, improve on. Monetary policy is centrally about the Fed exploiting irrationality, full stop, and cannot be explained or understood at all without that feature.

More in the comments. There are too many equations and figures to mirror it here, so you have to get the pdf if you're interested. This is for academics anyway.

25 Jun 2020

Concentration increasing? - Barokong

Is the US economy getting more concentrated or less? At the aggregate level, more. This is a widely noted fact, leading quickly to calls for more active government moves to break up big companies.

But at the local level, no.Diverging Trends in National and Local Concentration by  Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, Pierre-Daniel Sarte, and Nicholas Trachter documents the trend.

They make a concentration measure that is basically the sum of squared market shares, so up means more concentrated and down means less concentrated. This is the average of many different industries and markets.

The average concentration of national markets has gone up. But the concentration of smaller and smaller markets has gone down. More businesses are dividing up county and zip code markets.

Industries differ. This graph does not get a prize for ease of distinguishing the lines, but the two red lines just below zero are manufacturing and wholesale trade, where the industries with really dramatic reductions in local concentration are retail trade, finance insurance and real estate, and services.

What's going on? The natural implication is that the town once had 3 local restaurants, two local banks, and 3 stores. Now it has a McDonalds, a Burger King, a Denny's and an Applebees; a branch of Chase, B of A, and Wells Fargo, and a Walmart, Target, Best Buy, and Costco. National brands replace local stores, increasing the number of local stores.

However, that turns out not to be so obvious.

This graph shows what happens in the diverging industries (those in which national goes up, and local goes down) if you leave out the biggest company. Doing so, lowers the rise of national concentration, because we left out the single most concentrated firm. The lower line however, shows a positive effect. If we leave out the largest national firm, the local markets look more concentrated. If  national brands had just replaced local businesses, then when we leave them out, we should see lots of smaller shares.  The same thing happens if we leave out the second and third largest.

What's going on? Well, they look at what happens when Wal-Mart comes to town.

The lower line is the effect on concentration in the years before and after the top national firm enters a market. Concentration drops. If, when Wal-Mart came to town, all the exiting firms went under, concentration would rise. The upper line shows you concentration ignoring the largest enterprise. It's unchanged. Either the mom and pop stores do, in fact, stay in business; or new smaller firms enter along with Wal-Mart. The phenomenon is not just the replacement of all smaller businesses by a larger number of national chains.

The paper was presented at the San Francisco Fed "Macroeconomics and Monetary Policy" conference, where I am today. The discussions, by Huiyu Li and François Gourio, were excellent. As with all micro data there is a lot to quibble with. Is a zip code really a market? Much of the data are industry+zip codes with a single firm, both before and (slightly less often) after. Maybe Walmart and other stores drag in customers from other places? And of course, concentration is not the same thing as competition. The SF Fed will, in a week or so, post the conference, papers, and discussions.

22 Jun 2020

The High Cost of Good Intentions - Barokong

If indeed the Congress will now turn to entitlement reform, as house speaker Paul Ryan has promised, this will be the book to have on your desk. (Ryan already blurbed it (back cover) as did Bill Bradley, Sam Nunn, George Shultz and Alan Greenspan.)

If you think entitlement programs, and the political hash that enacts them, are recent problems, or the fault of one political party, think again. John's main lesson is that the emergence of bloated entitlements is a hardy feature of our (and many other countries') democracies.  He does this by just reading the history.

The habit of expanding entitlements started early. Chapter 2:

Revolutionary War pensions were the nation's first entitlement program. ... between 1789 and 1793, the federal government agreed to pay annual pensions to Continental Army soldiers and seamen who became disabled as a result of wartime injuries or illness. [later, as an inducement to service]...
For forty years, Congress enlarged and expnaded these benefits until, by the 1830s, they covered virtually all Revolutionary War seamen and soldiers, including volunteers and members of the state militia and their widows, regardless of disability or income.
That costs might balloon beyond forecasts was not a total surprise

Opponents of the 1818 law predicted that granting lifetime pensions to Revolutionary War veterans who were "in reduced circumstances" would be costly. Senator Nathaniel Macon of North Carolina observed, "Pensions in all countries begin on a small scale and are at first generally granted on proper consideration, an that they increase till at last they are granted as often on whim or caprice...[it] will on experiment, be found an endless task. It will drain any treasury, no matter how full."
Yet, the service pension law of 1818, which granted such pensions to all revolutionary war veterans who were "in reduced circumstances"

produced a massive surge in applications and an unexpected and unprecedented cost to the Treasury. The law's proponents had estimated that fewer than two thousand veterans would qualify and that the annual cost might reach $115,000. But by the end of 1819, more than twenty-eight thousand individuals had applied... The 1818 law's annual cost to the Treasury had ballooned from $300,000 to a staggering $1.8 million. ..widespread charges of pension fraud and corruption. A law designed to assist destitute veterans was providing pensions to many financially well-off veterans and even many who had never fought for the nation's independence.
...Congress's underestimate of the cost was on the first of many underestimates. These miscalculations are invariably due to Congress's failure to appreciate how an offer of entitlement assistance can cause individuals to change their circumstances to qualify for aid they have previously managed to live without.
This is a familiar theme in entitlement programs, but just how far back it goes was news to me.

A bigger theme of the book is the politics of entitlements. That also starts long ago. Congressman Dudley Marvin of New York reports

"In the villages in his part of the country, when the semi-annual pay day arrived, they [pensioners] were in the habit of forming themselves into companies, then forming a column and thus marching to receive their quota of the public bounty"
This spectacle served as an early hint of the sense of entitlement that can affect groups of recipients of public assistance... such groups can develop an expectation that society owes them benefits that initially were bestowed out of gratitude for military service or a desire to alleviate hardship. We will observe this expectation and the sometimes remarkable behavior it generates in later chapters on twentieth-century entitlements.
For example, a century later, the linkage between individual payroll taxes and benefits was crucial to the "enactment, long-run endurance, and, ultimately high cost" of Social Secrurity

Paying payroll taxes gave [gives!] program participants a sense that by contributing to the program during their working years, they were establishing an earned right to benefits when they retired. ... Senate Finance Committee chairman Walter George noted" Social security is not a handout; it is not a charity; it is not relief. It is an earned right based upon the contributions and earnings of the individual.
When [President Roosevelt] was challenged about financing Social Security with a regressive payroll tax rather than general fund revenues from the progressive income tax, he replied, "We put those pay roll contributions there so as to give the contributors a legal, moral, and political right to collect their pensions and their unemployment benefits. With those taxes in there, no damn politician can ever scrap my social security program. Those taxes aren't a matter of economics, they're straight politics"
Civil war pensions followed the same path, on a larger scale

The civil war pension program began with the same high-mihnded, noble, and limited goal as Revolutionary War pensons: to compensate soldiers for the loss of life and limb suffered in wartime service to their country... A half-century later the program evolved into a general disability and retirement program for virtually all Union soldiers...Congress also eventually stretched eligibility for pensions to virtually all widows and survivors of union soldiers, even those who had married many decades after the war had ended..
Costs ballooned, for example on the 1879 arrears law, that allowed soldiers to file disability claims after the original deadlines

The bill's senate floor manager, Sentaor John Ingalls, had put the total at $18 to $20 million. Hayes administration officials estimated a much higher cost of between $50 and $150 million. ... Two years after the law's passage President Chester A. Arthur reported that arrears payments had already cost taxpayers $235 million...It is fair to conclude that the law added nearly $400 million to pension expenditures during the 1880s alone
New interest and lobbying groups emerged

claims agents led the advocates for arrears payments. These agents, certified by the pensions office, assisted veterans and widows with the complex application process, represented claimants in appeals before the pension office, and received compensation for their services. ... claims' agents had emerged as a powerful lobbying force.
... The arrears act also spawned a second large national lobbying force: The Grand Army of the Republic (GAR). The GAR's evolution from a service organization ta special interest lobby..would be followed time and again by twentieth-centry lobby groups...
At this time, politicians discovered how important entitlements could be to electoral success, beginning the mad use of public money to buy votes that we see today.

The (1884) election campaign witnessed the use of the Pension office as a political machine to gain partisan advantage. (good story follows)
... Along with this legislation came an important and powerful discovery by the Congress and the executive branch: broadly distributing cash benefits directly to a large segment of the voting population could produce significant electoral advantages.
The story repeats again with WWI veterans.

There are occasional retrenchments and reforms, especially useful to ponder now.

Candidate Cleveland renewed his previous campaign promise to `cleanse the pension rolls and limit ... benefits to 'worthy' veterans. ...Voter backlash against the tariff and pension corruption contributed to President Cleveland's landslide victory.... Cleveland took immediate actions... The GAR rallied against this minor reform as if the pension rolls had been purged, decrying "false economy which shaves and pares to the quick at the expense of honor, justice and principle." ... by the time Preisdent Cleveland left office in 18997, there were 12,500 more Civil war pensioners than when he had taken office.
Interestingly, Franklin Roosevelt was a great enemy of large veteran benefits. Roosevelt

shared the founding fathers' belief that all citizens had an obligation to serve their country in wartime, and therefore did not represent a special class of individuals entitled to government benefits merely because they had served during wartime. .. His views were decidedly at odds with Congress, which invariably concluded that all wartime veterans, especially when they reached old age, stood as a special class.
Roosevelt also thought balanced budgets were important. He acted cleverly:

On Sunday night, the President gave the first of his legendary fireside chats, reassuring the public that the US banking system was in should shape. On Monday he sent to Congress his third message: to modify the Volstead Act to permit the sale of beer... an extremely popular proposal. Now the Senate was in a bind. Under Senate rules, action on the Volstead act could not take place until the Economy act had been addressed...
and they passed it

The law repealed all entitlements to pensions that had been granted to veterans of World War I, the Spanish American War, the Boxer Rebellion and the Philippine insurrection.. For the first [last?] time in US history, a large-scale entitlement had been repealed. ...
Several factors account for President Roosevelt's remarkable success in reducing veteran's pensions. The economy and federal budget's dire situation presented the president with a national emergency, and in Washington such emergencies are a strong predicate for action.. President Roosevelt was also willing to use his veto power to sustain his policies...
Roosevelt's attitude to veterans did not last.

*****

I'm up to the beginning, really, of the book, "The birth of the modern entitlement state." The centerpiece of the book is not these historical antecedents, but the political story of how the current US entitlements system evolved.

That story starts with the New Deal. It also brings in the judiciary, the "role of the federal courts in making public policy:"

The new Deal entitlements ushered in a new era for the federal courts. ... once federal entitlement rights had been granted, the nature and extent of these legal right had to be adjudicated....In the 1960s and 1970s, the federal courts .. expanded[ed] the legal rights of entitlement claimants in welfare, health care, and nutrition. Ultimately federal court decisions created welfare entitlement right where none had been legislated.
There are many more themes worth stressing, even in the ancient history, and I won't prolong the quotes delicious as they are.

One theme: Our government routinely liberalizes entitlements when budget surpluses are strong, and at least slows down their expansion in bad fiscal times. It also liberalizes entitlements in bad economic times.

That bears centrally on the current reform question.  Our entitlements are, no surprise, on an unsustainable path. We will either reform them, in a way that reduces federal spending, or we will substantially raise taxes on the "middle class," including a large payroll tax increase and likely a european style VAT on top of growth-killing income and corporate taxes.

If one wishes for a reform on the expenditure side, the great question is whether it must be done directly or via "starving the beast" of tax revenue. For example, I advocate a VAT. A common complaint is that the VAT is not only a much more economically efficient way of raising a given revenue, it is a great way to raise much more revenue, and my critics complain it soon will do that and provoke even greater spending. The VAT shifts the top of the Laffer curve to the right, and in my critics' view, the US government will operate at the top of the long-run Laffer curve given structural limitations on its tax code.

I have held out hope that our democracy could contain itself to spend less than the top of the Laffer curve allows, so we can jettison the insane inefficiency and corruption of our tax code, and have one that is vastly more economically efficient. The opposite view really amounts to belief that democracy is fatally flawed. Moreover, I note that starve the beast tax reductions have led to massive deficit expansions, yet large debt and deficits have not yet seemed to provide much pressure against entitlement spending.

John's history is a strong push toward starve the beast, at least in the negative direction. Surpluses lead to benefit expansions, quickly.

Another theme: The accounting gimmicks such as "trust funds." Surpluses in trust funds lead to benefit expansions, even if there are huge deficits outside. And "trust fund" accounting gimmicks also go back a long way.

As we (hopefully) start to think about reform, I think the only hope is to break out of "we're spending too much there will be a debt crisis" vs. "you heartless evil person, just look at (deserving person). How can you throw her off the bus." The way to do that, I think, is to focus on the disincentives of our social programs, not on the cost or the worthiness of recipients. I find some comfort in John's history, that occasional retrenchments, including the above and the welfare reforms of the 1990s got through politically by looking at fraud (a form of disincentive) and other disincentives.

This is a history and a political history, not a reform proposal, nor an economic analysis of disincentives. Still, John's history is also full of quotes reflecting the centuries old tension in welfare programs between helping those in need and disincentives, which I'll cover in the next post. That history ought to help.

A note for graduate students: This book is very well written, and you should read it to emulate writing style as well as for the subject. No, it does not knock you over the head with beautiful sentences as John McPhee might. It is, however, beautifully structured. The whole book and each chapter starts with a complete summary of the argument, and the chapter fills it out. It could go on for thousands of pages, but manages to tell just enough of the story so you see the historical detail, but not enough so you get lost in what must been have fascinating historical detail. Yet this is not a standard quickie book aimed at a policy controversy. This is a deep piece of scholarship. Everything is footnoted -- 78 pages of footnotes and reference all together.

20 Jun 2020

Clemens on minimum wage - Barokong

Jeff Clemens offers a "roadmap for navigating recent research" on minimum wages in a nice CATO policy analysis.  A review and a doubt.

He discusses the recent claims that minimum wages don't hurt low-skilled people. This is an impressive and readable account of a vast literature. It's not as easy as it seems to evaluate cause and effect in economics.  Evidence from small increases in the minimum wage over short time intervals in some locations in good economic times may not tell you the effects of large increases over longer time intervals in all locations in bad economic times.

The "new conventional wisdom," of small effects, Jeff reports, ignores a lot of the more recent work, and especially work that  uses "data from individual-level administrative records" rather than "aggregate data and survey data," work that runs "experiments whenever possible," and work that "transparently analyzes compact historical episodes in the U.S. experience" (P. 8)

(The "transparency" issue is one that Jeff only touches superficially but I sense an important detailed critique that needs to be written.)

Economics has become more empirical lately, and that's a good thing. But "facts without logic" pose a conundrum. Either the facts or the logic are wrong. Good for science, but one might want vast public policies with the possibility of unintended consequences to ruin a lot of people's lives to wait for facts and logic to be reconciled. Jeff runs through the arguments why large permanent increases in the minimum wage might not hurt, and finds them wanting.

An under-appreciated point: work is far more than just I work, you pay me:

"the details of employees’ schedules, perks, fringe benefits, and the organization of the workplace are central to firms’ management of both their costs and productivity. "
Employers can react to a minimum wage not by cutting back workers, but by selecting better workers, denying fringe benefits, making you pay for uniforms, insisting on schedules that are inconvenient for you but convenient for them, insisting you be on call at all times for example, and so forth. Since we don't have data on these adjustments,

empirical evidence will tend to understate the minimum wage’s negative effects and overstate its benefits.
Jeff, p. 9

Work hours can be at the convenience of the worker or at the convenience of the firm. The pace of work can be fast or slow, safer or riskier, and can require more or less mental energy. Compensation can either include or exclude health insurance, retirement contributions, and other benefits. A job’s location can be more or less preferable, and opportunities for advancement (within or outside the firm) can be more or less ample.
A second effect, which Jeff doesn't mention: Which workers get the jobs will change. Workers who can adapt to inflexible schedules, don't need benefits, are well trained, get the jobs. Economic policy discussion too often takes the average as example and assumes each person is just like the average. The economy is all about how people jobs and businesses are different - "heterogeneity" and "selection" in economic parlance.

A doubt

But let me express a doubt. Why do we discuss minimum wages so much? I think they irritate free-market economists because they are such a clear, simple, and paradigmatic stupid idea. The first insight of your Econ 101 class is that price controls destroy markets:

We see it over and over again, in centuries of experience boiled down to this simple graph. Price controls, rent controls, wage controls all have led over and over again to the same sorry story. And when supply is greater than demand, who gets the good, apartment, or job gets all screwed up.  Don't try to transfer income by screwing up prices. Along with tariffs and disincentives of 100% marginal tax rates, there isn't much more essential to the basic canon of economics.

So, if you're a young ambitious economist, and you want to attract a lot of attention, what could be better than empirical work showing magic: Wait, minimum wages don't hurt employment! Hooray, all the old fogies are wrong! If you are an activist, annoyed by the neoliberal orthodoxy, it's catnip. Hooray, the government can go ahead and control prices and thereby transfer incomes!

And if you're a regular economist, nothing could be more annoying.

So we pay a lot of attention and generate a lot of controversy.

But here is my doubt. Let us line up a list of economic circumstances and government policies that are potentially hurting disadvantaged Americans:

  • Minimum wages. Sure.
  • The rest of the massive set of labor laws, regulations, and taxes, all of which reduce  employment, especially of less skilled workers.
  • A rotten education system, beholden to teachers unions.
  • Criminal justice pathology, including drug laws, life-destroying treatment of innocents, lack of education and training, and laws and rules against hiring people with criminal records.
  • Zoning and building restrictions, resulting in no housing near jobs.
  • Occupational licensing ridiculousness. A thousand hours and a big test to open a nail salon.
  • The death by a thousand cuts of restrictions on low-price low-income entrepreneurship. Business licenses, zoning that disallows businesses in residential areas, laws that make it hard to hire people -- all of which sends low income people to the illegal economy, which is a poor way to transition to the legal economy. A tiny one: permits for and bans on repeated garage sales (I just found out about this).
  • Disincentives of social programs and subsidies, leading to 100% marginal tax rates for many.
  • Disincentives of "affordable" or other subsidized housing.
  • Social background: Many people grow up in neighborhoods where there are no two-parent families, few adults with permanent jobs, widespread crime, no business. Government actions bear a lot of the blame for this.
I could go on. I'll allow "wave of cheap imports from China and floods of low skilled immigrants," from the right, and perhaps "growing monopoly of the huge companies" from the left, even though I think both are silly. Add all the travails facing the kind of people affected by minimum wages you can think of.

What I would like to see, then, is some sense of priorities. Which of these is really hurting people the most? As you can tell I have a hunch that minimum wages are a problem, sure, a particularly clear pathology, sure, a particularly annoying piece of economic ignorance, sure, but that by focusing on them we really aren't focusing on the biggest problems holding many Americans back. We all want to help Americans with low skills and (currently) low incomes to get ahead. (It would be nice if the left acknowledged that occasionally.) But I'm not sure that allowing them to keep working at $9 an hour is the most important step in that direction, or that a $15 per hour minimum (legal!) wage will be the greatest sin of the many things our government does to hold people back.

Update: Jonathan Meer points me to a lovely essay by Tom Leonard, making this point more eloquently than I. No idea is genuinely new I guess! It's not a fight about how to help poor people. It's a fight about economics and the poor people are (as usual) the sorry victims of intellectual warfare:

Minimum-wage effects, at least for current U.S. magnitudes, are small potatoes. Of several more important policy concerns—entitlement reform, health insurance, CPI calculation, for example—none has generated anything like the vituperation that has characterized the minimum-wage controversy. But if the minimum-wage controversy is not especially important to the economy, it is very important to economics, and, thereby, to the status of economics as a policy science.
The reason, I want to argue, is that the core of modern economics— neoclassical price theory—is seen to be at stake. In particular, minimum- wage research has come to be seen as a test of the applicability of neoclassical price theory to the determination of wages and employment. The modern minimum-wage controversy is not just a technical quarrel over the sign and magnitude of wage-elasticity coefficients; it is the latest chapter in a longstanding methodological dispute over whether and in what domains neoclassical price theory can be said to properly apply.
His footnotes are even great

1. In the wake of Card and Krueger 1995, one Nobel laureate intoned, “I tremble for my profession” (Miller 1996). Another made reference to “camp-following whores” (Buchanan 1996). A third eminence called Card and Krueger’s main interlocutors, David Neumark and William Wascher, “heroes” (Barro 1996).
This is the kind of history of economic ideas I wish we had more of.

Cost divergence - Barokong

Source: Marginal Revolution
This lovely picture is fromWhy are the prices so D*mn High? by Eric Helland and Alex Tabarrok. (It's covered in Marginal Revolution: TheInitial post,Bloat does not explain the rising cost of education, and an upcoming summary on health care.)

Bottom line: objects got cheap, people got expensive. Technology, automation, globalization (thank you China), and quality improvement made goods cheaper. People, especially skilled people, got more expensive. All of which should make you feel good if you're a person and especially a skilled person.

The source of the relative rise in the cost of education and health care is less clear. Looking around at  a typical university,  school system, or hospital suggests massive bloat and inefficiency. Alex suggests  not:

I assumed that regulation, bloat and bureaucracy, monopoly power and the Baumol effect would each explain some of what is going on. After looking at this in depth, however, my conclusion is that it’s almost all Baumol effect.

In case you need to look it up (Wikipedia),

Baumol's cost disease (or the Baumol effect) is the rise of salaries in jobs that have experienced no or low increase of labor productivity, in response to rising salaries in other jobs that have experienced higher labor productivity growth....
The rise of wages in jobs without productivity gains is from the requirement to compete for employees with jobs that have experienced gains and so can naturally pay higher salaries, just as classical economics predicts....
The classic example:

the same number of musicians is needed to play a Beethoven string quartet today as was needed in the 19th century; the productivity of classical music performance has not increased. On the other hand, the real wages of musicians (as in all other professions) have increased greatly since the 19th century.
The basic idea, if productivity of skilled people rises in one place, then you have to pay more to the skilled people who stay behind even in an industry like education that has had no change in technology. In education, where it's pretty clear that technology has not improved, they find that we use fewer teachers per student, and teachers are paid more. Most of the rise in the cost of health care, they claim, is greater doctor salaries. My personal observation of the massive growth of school bureaucracies, and astonishing and growing waste in our health system is denied by their data.

I think the question is still open, but theirs is a challenging view which is why I point to it in the blog. They close with a suggestion that education and medicine are ripe for a big technological disruption.

As they point out,  "The cost disease is not a disease but a blessing." It is the result of the tremendous increase in productivity of skilled people over the last few decades. Compared to stagnant periods of human history, a chance to fight about divvying up a bountiful pie is not the worst thing that could happen to us.

Two minor quibbles: We should not state the "cost disease" proposition wages have increased while productivity has not increased. In the Baumol proposition, and to a good approximation in the huge change in musician wages from 1826 to now, musicians are paid their marginal products.  The physical marginal product of string-quartet playing is the same, as (apparently) is the physical marginal product of teaching, but the value marginal product has risen, which is why wages rise.

When skilled people leave music playing for other fields, music playing contracts, and people are willing to pay more to hear music played. (All of this may or may not be true about music. I'm just using it to illustrate the theorem.) You can charge more for a string quartet performance, so the amount of (real) dollars produced by playing a string quartet rises in parallel with the productivity of potential musicians in other fields.

The pure "cost disease" phenomenon, then, should accompany a dramatic reduction in the physically unchanged technology. And indeed, a few horse shoers and craft blacksmiths still exist, and charge modern prices to wealthy horse owners.

But health care and education have rapidly expanded, not contracted. We need a different source for the fact that the value marginal product has risen while the physical marginal product has not done so.   Evidently, demand for health care and education has risen as well. We need both observations to account for the rising relative cost.

8 Jun 2020

Wealth and taxes, part I - Barokong

(This is Part I of a series. See theoverview for a summary. The punchline comes in Part V.)

Last November I had the pleasure of discussing "Top Wealth in the United States: New Estimates and Implications for Taxing the Rich" a very nice paper by Matthew Smith, Owen Zidar and Eric Zwick at the NBER asset pricing meetings, presented by Eric. The paper prompts a series of blog posts on wealth distribution and wealth taxes. I'll try to stick to points that haven't been made a hundred times already.

The paper mostly examines  Saez and Zucman's 2016 QJE paper on wealth inequality.  As many others have found, the Saez Zucman numbers are, ... let's say somewhat overstated.

Their bottom line is to cut Saez and Zucman in half. As I read the paper I think this is conservative -- and when we ask the obvious questions that the whole enterprise begs to be asked (which Smith et al don't do, but I will) a chasm of emptiness opens up, and the questions end up emptier than their answers.

The first thing you have to understand is the nature of wealth. Here is most people's impression of what wealth is:

That's not it at all. As Zwick et al say,

“Less than half of top wealth takes the form of liquid securities with clear market values”

So, the question is how do we measure the "wealth" that is not liquid securities with clear market values, like the profits of privately owned businesses? And, given that there is not US data on wealth (yet, thank goodness), even the part that is a security is hard to measure.

Enter "capitalization." The main idea in Saez and Zucman, reexamined by Smith et al., is that we measure "wealth" by measuring income, and then translating that income to wealth by assuming it will last forever and discounting it at some rate. In equations

Wealth = Income / discount rate

We have data from the IRS on income. So, let's follow along on Zwick et al.'s best story, how we find wealth invested in bonds from IRS individual interest income data and total bonds outstanding data:

“In 2014, the aggregate flow of [taxable] interest income was $98B, and the stock of fixed income wealth was $11T. The ratio gives the average yield, r = $98B/$11T   = 0.89%. Using this yield to capitalize income amounts to multiplying every dollar of interest income by 1/0.89% = 113 to estimate fixed income wealth. … Implementing equation (4) for fixed income gives an estimate of top fixed income wealth of $42B × 113 = $4.7T of fixed income wealth held by the top 0.1%. The bottom 99.9% estimate is $56B × 113 = $6.4T .
My emphasis.

You may have wondered, if we're just going to mulitply income by a number and call it wealth, why are we bothering to measure the wealth distribution at all? Let's just use the income distribution! You get one answer here -- if you call it wealth you get to multiply by 113! Since only some kinds of income get this treatment, kinds that are more likely to be held by wealthy people, that makes the numbers look much more unequal.

Smith et al's point though is not this basic one. Rather they look carefully at the calculation. This calculation assumes that all "fixed income" assets pay the same, low, rate of interest. Another well established fact is that rich people get better rates of return on their assets.

Here is Smith et al's plot of the actual rate of return that people earn on their fixed income investments. The uber wealthy earn 6% on their fixed income investments. This is not a small effect. In our capitalization factors, wealth = income / discount rate,

1/0.01 = 100

1/0.06 = 16.7

Changing from a 0.01 discount rate to a 0.06 discount rate pulls the wealth estimate per dollar of income down from 100 to 16.7. That's a lot. Smith et al:

“the adjustment reduces the top capitalization factor—and thus estimated top fixed income wealth—by a factor of 4.7, or 80%”
This is huge, to say the least.

(Note the irony. People who worry about wealth inequality are usually bemoan the fact that rich people earn higher returns on average than not so rich people, as it apparently will make inequality worse over time.  But the same higher average return must mean a lower multiples for converting income to wealth. You just can't have it both ways.

Higher returns are not some evil plot. The largely come from the fact that rich people buy riskier assets, like stocks and  junk bonds, and less rich people buy safer but lower yielding assets like bank accounts.  OK, It is to some extent a plot. Lots of regulations prohibit lower income people from buying the kinds of assets that make rich people richer in the name of consumer protection. The SEC is loosening some of these regulations.)

Beyond fixed income, the capitalization game gets even muddier, in both papers. What income flow are you going to capitalize?

“In the case of C-corporation equities, the income flow is dividends plus [realized] capital gains."
I think that's an accounting mistake, common in this literature. You cannot take the realized capital gains as an "income" flow for capitalization purposes. Suppose you buy a stock for $1, and it grows to $100. You sell $10 of the stock, but now you only have $90 left. You can't keep doing this forever, as the capitalization assumes.  That's fundamentally different than the company is worth $100, makes a $10 profit and gives you a $10 dividend. I'll be curious to hear from better accountants than I whether you can sensibly capitalize realized capital gains. Onwards...

For S-corporation equities, the income flow is S-corporation  income. For proprietor and partnership wealth, the income flow is the sum of proprietor income and partnership income  [ “capital” income?].  In the  case of real estate, property tax is capitalized to estimate housing assets ….”
Ok, that's income, what is the discount rate?

“Private business returns are harder to estimate than fixed income returns because private business wealth is harder to observe than fixed income wealth…We focus on multiple-based valuation models”
So we go from multiples to estimate a multiple... This all seems rather circular.

The bottom line? The game, as announced by Saez and Zucman is this: We start with the  pretax value of “capital” income, including asset income, proprietor income and partnership income, but not labor income (wages, bonuses, etc) or social security income. We multiply by various huge 1/r numbers to call them "wealth".  By doing that and using low r numbers, the "wealth" distribution looks much more extreme than the income distribution. As you can see the 1/r assumption allows great latitude in how this calculation is going to come out.

****

I spent a lot of time in asset pricing, and this paper was presented at an asset pricing meeting, so let me offer a little bit of what asset pricing has to say about these kinds of procedures.

The real capitalization formula is

P/D = 1/(r-g)

the price - dividend ratio is equal to one over the difference of the discount rate and the growth rate of dividends. Shhh! If the wealth inequality crowd realizes they can subtract g their multipliers will explode! (Joke. Of course we always use the right numbers)

The function 1/(r-g) is very sensitive to r and g, especially for low discount rates like the 1% we were using for bonds. Going down from 2% to 1% doubles the value. So, if you want to fiddle with values, fiddle with discount rates.

The right discount rate is much higher for risky assets than risk free assets. Lots of people discount things with stock market risk using interest rates, and get absurdly too high values.

If you put the 20 best financial economists in the world together in a room, gave them all of a company's cash flow information, they could not come within a factor of 3 of the actual stock market value.  "Valuation" mostly consists of fiddling with discount rates to get the "right" answer. Maybe "multiples" isn't so bad after all.

In short, capitalizing income to get any sense of "wealth" is an inherently... absurdly imprecise game.

***

I don't mean to sound critical of Smith et al. They're doing the best they can given the Zucman and Saez rules of the game. But a little peek into this sausage factory should leave you wondering, just why are these the rules of the game? Why do we care (should we care) so much about the distribution of something that is essentially impossible to measure or define? If you are making money was a partner in an LLC you help to run, why should anyone care about a fictitious accounting "value" of that partnership? You can't sell it!

Why start with pretax income? If you pay half your income in taxes, does that not halve the value of the asset?  Why does "wealth" include the value of proprietor and partnership income but not labor income or social security income?

These are good questions for the next few blog posts. Stay tuned.

On to Part II

5 Jun 2020

Great Society Review - Barokong

The US is debating a fourth great wave of US government expansion. Theodore Roosevelt to Wilson the original progressive era and WWI; Frankin Roosevelt's new deal; and the Kennedy-Johnson-Nixon "great society" of this book came before us.

Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose, is in many ways the theme of the book. The Great Society offers lots of parallels to our time, and a cautionary tale that it will all end badly once again. But not all is the same, and the many ways our time is different from the 1960s is also good to ponder -- for better and for worse.

Amity is a gifted writer and storyteller. Pay attention to her books also for how they are written. How do you tell the story of an era in a way that is comprehensible and memorable? Amity picks a few central (and now often overlooked) people, a few programs, and a few benchmarks (the Dow, the price of gold), and tells the story of the era through their eyes. It's the Game of Thrones approach to the Great Society.  Do not expect even a comprehensive list of all great society programs, diff in diff regression discontinuity estimates of their causal effects, or even charts and graphs (all curiously packed in an appendix and never referred to in the text) or the customary eyeball-glazing recitations of statistics. This was her approach to the Great Depression in Forgotten Man, equally effective. It complements, but does not substitute for that more structural work.

Introduction

In case you don't get the point, Amity starts right off in the introduction with Michael Harrington who wrote "a then-famous bestseller called The Other America" and who worked for Sargent Shriver, which is one of the main characters of the book (Daenerys Targaryen?)

Why not socialism? The president had been in office three months, and he wanted new ideas to distinguish himself from his predecessor. Could the author bring up socialism at the lunch? The very word “socialism” had been toxic until recently. ... The taboo was weakening, though.
..“socialism” might sound too controversial for the White House. The writer could, however, pitch ideas that took the country toward socialism. ... Laws that backed up organized labor so it might represent a greater portion of the American workforce... Higher minimum wages... Minimum wages that covered more workers, even those who did not work in an office or full-time. A dramatic change in the training of bigoted policemen in the big cities. ... The money was simply in the wrong hands. ... a tax system that captured the elusive wealth of the superrich. The moment had come to level incomes in a systematic fashion.
..The story sounds like something that could happen today."
The 1960s and early 1970s included a huge expansion of programs. And the results were in the end mostly abject failure.

Today

progressive proposals that bear a strong resemblance to Michael Harrington’s, from redistribution via taxation to student debt relief to a universal guaranteed income, are becoming popular again. Once again, many Americans rate socialism as the generous philosophy. But the results of our socialism were not generous. May this book serve as a cautionary tale of lovable people who, despite themselves, hurt those they loved. Nothing is new. It is just forgotten.
It is also a refreshing reminder of just how old most of the "new" ideas we are being bombarded from on the left are -- and a warning of how long they will pester us, at least as long as we are unwilling to learn.

From an SDS (students for democratic society) manifesto:

"The wealthiest 1 percent of Americans own more than 80 percent of all personal shares of stock"
The capsule stories of the 1960s focus on the civil rights triumph, the remaining politically successul programs such as medicare and medicaid, the vietnam war, and a vague hippy nostalgia. Shales' story, and the central roles of the forgotten (largely)  men she tracks are a novel tonic.

Stories

Walter Reuther, head of United Auto Workers, is a central figure, and the fight between the old-left unions and the new-left students epitomized by Tom Hayden, for the soul of the Democratic party.

Sargent Shriver, and the Office of Economic Opportunity are the stand-in for many ill fated programs. It starts with the predictable story of chaos that results from a flood of federal money.   The flood of federal money  did not stop the cities from burning.  The OEO is the beginning of Federal support for "community action" programs, including political activity.

"Community action programs, the authors [of the Community Action Program Workbook—262 pages on how to apply for and run a federally funded program] wrote, should provide the “stimulation of change.” One marker of a successful community action group was that it “increased competence in protest activities.” The OEO ... welcomed experiments, including those where community action organizers paid by Washington were “facilitating the opportunities for the poor to participate in protest actions.”
That kind of language was enough to send mayors like Dick Daley through the roof.
In the end, the cities went up in flames. The OEO morphed in many ways. One interesting almost afterthought of the original program, legal aid to the poor -- who can obect to that, helping poor people who can't afford lawyers? -- ballooned the way all such programs do,

"the governor [Reagan] was after the lawyers again, assailing California Rural Legal Assistance. The nonprofit should have stuck to individual legal aid cases for rural indigents, Reagan said, but instead had “converted itself into a vehicle for class action lawsuits against various government agencies.” Reagan told the crowd that his staff had reckoned that if the CRLA won all its suits in California, the cost of welfare there would increase by $1 billion—the same amount Johnson and Shriver had first set as the budget for the entire War on Poverty."
Here was where the government started paying lawyers to sue the government for more government.

Amity tracks disastrous housing policies through the life of the Pruitt-Igoe housing project in St. Louis, begun in earnest but remote social-planner hope, though destroying the community where it sat, and ending in controlled demolition.

"In some cases, only welfare families were entitled to the lowest rents at Pruitt-Igoe. And to receive welfare under Missouri’s rules, a family could have only one parent—the mother. So families considering life in the towers had to make a terrible choice: stay together or take the apartment. ..Families who moved into Pruitt-Igoe often lost a father. ...The social workers even policed apartments at night, checking to see if fathers had secretly returned, grounds for eviction. "
The consequences of which are predictable.

"Pruitt-Igoe elevators, which stopped only every few floors, were muggers’ traps. Poor maintenance meant the elevators often jammed, leaving gangs’ victims in with them for long extra minutes. The gangs lurked in the halls and made tenants “run the gantlet” to get to their doors. Young men threw bricks and rocks at windows and streetlamps; the activity was a regular sport..... Because there were no toilets on the ground floor, children had accidents there and in the elevators, and the elevators gradually became public toilets. The community area was a sorry joke... No one seemed able to stop the decay. "
I love this:

"Social scientists were descending on the complex to conduct multiyear investigations, and that irritated the tenants further."
we've been at it a long time, missing the ends of our noses.

"At Pruitt-Igoe, rents were scaled to income. Every time the Straughters’ wages went up, their rent went up, a tax on striving"
Income-capped rent subsidies are with us today.

"After tens of millions and decades of urban renewal spending, Detroit did not look renewed. Detroit looked, Mayor Cavanagh said, like a city that now did need a Marshall Plan, like “Berlin in 1945.” Almost three thousand businesses had been sacked, with damage many times greater than in Watts just two years before. "
In the end

"There was hypocrisy [and I would say a great deal of paternalistic disdain] in the  different treatment of the middle class and poor. For the middle class, the government had aimed to re-create and sustain the world of Alexis de Tocqueville, subsidizing home purchasers for suburban settlers. For the poor, however, the government had operated in the world of Karl Marx: government-sponsored housing blocks with tenants, not owners. Black citizens—Pruitt-Igoe was now all black—had been ripped from their roots when they moved North, uprooted again when they were moved for urban renewal, and then placed in high-rise rentals where putting down new roots was impossible."
"How might neighborhoods like this one have turned out if local companies, local authorities, and local individuals had led in the 1950s and 1960s, building their own Great Society? How might St. Louis have looked if the jobs had stayed? No one knew.  But here in the shadow of
Pruitt-Igoe, Father Shocklee and Pruitt-Igoe tenants had discovered one possibility. With his small housing program, Father Shocklee had shown that “the poor” were more like the middle class than people supposed. They gained from something only when they had a chance to own it."

Daniel Patrick Moynihan is a second central character in Amity's story (Tyrion Lannister?) Moynihan was a Democrat, but wrote the important and controversial "The Negro Family: The Case For National Action," pointing out, among many other things, the perverse incentives of welfare.

"From his work at Harvard and in Washington, Moynihan thought he had learned what was wrong with American welfare. The first trouble was that poverty funding tended to flow to bureaucrats—social workers, not poor people. “Feeding the horses to feed the sparrows,” Moynihan called it.  In many states, those social workers spent their time in perverse endeavors: inspecting apartments at Pruitt-Igoe to make sure no fathers were present, for example. Taxes hit people when they entered the workforce, reducing the appeal of working just as Eartha Kitt said. ...In some states, for example, a welfare mother working at the same job as a family father not on welfare took in 50 percent more than the man, because she was entitled to keep a portion of her welfare. Why not bypass the bureaucrats and send the money to families, regardless of whether fathers were present?"
And then he took a job with Nixon, and became one of Nixon's main advisers. He nearly got passed a negative income tax, the equivalent of today's universal basic income. In his grudgingNew York Times review, Binyamin Applebaum finds this story "curious," because it did not pass in the end. But it nearly did, which makes it important. Amity covers well the failed attempt to over rule right to work laws, which also nearly passed. Near failures good and bad are equally instructive to our current situation, no matter the flap of butterfly wings that determines their fate.  (The quick review of the UK's longer experience starting p. 335 is well worth it too.)

I found this amusing

"The crowd at Harvard had held even Hubert Humphrey, and at times Robert Kennedy, in contempt. Any interest in Nixon Harvard rated worse than reprehensible
The schoolmates of Moynihan’s children stopped talking to them. Alan Rabinowitz, a fellow academic, wrote a satirical poem chiding Moynihan for his betrayal, “The Knight Before Nixon.”
Plus ça change in academia, and much Trump-deranged society.

Fairchild semiconductor plays a small but significant role. It's good to remember how different the US economy of the 1950s was. There really were a few very large companies in most industries, and most technology came out of defense. The emergence of an innovative private tech sector is one of those many ways we are not replaying exactly the same song. The slow emergence of Toyota and VW, selling better cars and forcing change in Detroit is another.

Money and gold

A minor story for the book caught my eye, and I pass it on first as many blog readers are interested in monetary issues. One of the themes of the book --  the snow level on the great white wall -- is the price of gold, and the US continuing problems of gold outflow, the emergence of inflation, and the eventual collapse of the Bretton Woods system. This is an event much too little studied by macroeconomists, though my international and economic history friends tell me that shows just how parochial we are and we should start reading their papers.

In macroeconomics perhaps we are too influenced by Milton Friedman's great called home run, the 1968 presidential address, where he forecast inflation would emerge along with unemployment. But Friedman's story was told entirely in terms of the money supply and to a lesser extent interest rate targets, the one too large and the other too low. And that is how the stylized history has come down to us: Fiscal deficits from the Great Society and Vietnam war, combined with too loose monetary policy, set off inflation.

That story leads to the puzzle of our age: If the (by current standards) comparatively minor Johnson-Nixon deficits set off a grand inflation why do our huge deficits have no such effect now, despite many officials stated desire for more inflation?

The story of the book reminds us that the mechanics were quite different then, and leads me to the speculative thought that the gold standard mechanism brought on inflation much more quickly than our current arrangements. In part, it may have been designed to do so -- to force governments to make fiscal adjustments quickly rather than let the problem get so big the fiscal adjustment will be immense, much as Doug Diamond and Raghu Rajan model short term debt and its runs as a disciplining device to managers.

The world was different then. We had fixed exchange rates, and it was difficult to move capital from country to country -- to buy foreign stocks, for example. Bretton Woods was not really set up to handle today's large trade deficits financed by large capital account surpluses. When the US started running trade deficits, other countries piled up dollars, and the main thing they could do with those dollars was to turn them in to their central banks, who in turn used them to drain gold from the Fed. So, it strikes me that open capital markets that allow us to finance large trade deficits are an important reason our system has held up so long.

Amity tells the sad tale of stopgap measures -- bans on using dollars for foreign travel, half-hearted interest rate increases, looney schemes for the Federal Government to mine gold, and of course the tragedy of price controls.

In any case, the remaining gold standard between central banks, not very open capital markets, not very open currency markets and fixed exchange rates were a crucial part of the inflation dynamics in this period, not just bad money supply or interest rate rules.

The episode also raises the counterfactual question why the US did not use the many devices used to defend the gold standard through the centuries. Borrow gold. Temporarily suspend convertibility.

Coda

At the end of a review that had to be negative, though he had to admit the quality of the book,New York Times review, Binyamin Applebaum writes

"Half a century later, in the midst of a revival of interest in ideas like Moynihan’s basic income proposal, readers may find themselves wondering whether the nation’s problem is really too much government — or, perhaps, not enough."
One wonders just what it would take to ever change his mind on that one. Were the 60s riots, the 70s economy, and the evident pathologies of the welfare system not bad enough, or do we have to go full Venezuela first? After all these years, and with the same policies on agenda, with the same predictable disincentives and unintended consequences, could not his call be at least for smarter government, not just more? For a larger government that learns from rather than repeats this sad history?

English

Anies Baswedan

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